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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Sec. 78-2-2(3)(j).

The order appealed from is a

final order disposing of all claims of all parties.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Kirberg had
failed to produce sufficient facts to create a jury question
whether the initial "at-will" relationship of the parties had been
modified by subsequent representations and conduct of West One.
The standard of review is correction of error, since a grant of
summary judgment presents a question of law only.

Johnson v.

Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 977, 1000 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The determinative authority for this appeal is Johnson v.
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), and Brehanv v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of Case:
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial

District Courtf Hon. Frank G. Noel.

1

2.

Course of Proceedings:
Kirberg filed a complaint for breach of implied contract, and

breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

She alleged

that West One had violated an implied promise not to terminate her
without cause.

This termination was alleged to also violate an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The count

relating to a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was dismissed
by agreement of the parties.
West One moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining
complaint for breach of implied contract. West One relied upon a
disclaimer of any implied promise regarding termination without
cause.

This disclaimer was found in the fine print of Kirberg's

employment application form.
affidavit, setting

Kirberg opposed the motion with her

forth what

she was told, the termination

practices she observed, and the employee manual, giving the basis
for her understanding that West One had a corporate policy against
termination without cause. Kirberg specifically averred that the
any initial at-will relationship had been modified by subsequent
representations and conduct.
West One also argued that it had "cause" for terminating
Kirberg. Kirberg opposed this motion by averring that she was
historically a good employee, and that she had acted reasonably in
handling a difficult situation.
2

3.

Disposition in Lower Court:
The trial court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that West

One was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the
written disclaimer in the employment application form.

The trial

court did not rule on whether there was a jury question as to just
cause for terminating Kirberg.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Kirberg was hired by West One in October, 1988 as a bank
teller.

(R. 41).

When she applied for work at West One, she

filled out an application form.

This form contained, in fine

print, a short statement that Kirberg could be "discharged at any
time without notice and without cause."

(R. 118). Further, the

form even stated in the fine print that there was "no express or
implied employment contract between [her] and the company [West
One]".

(R. 118). Kirberg never read the disclaimer of implied

terms or the disclaimer of requirement of just cause when she was
hired as a teller. It was simply included in the forms she was to
fill out.

It was never referred to in the employment interview,

and there was no oral statement made to her that she could be fired
without cause. (R. 93, f2).

Since summary judgment was granted against Kirberg, the
facts in the record are construed most strongly against West One.

3

The disclaimers given Kirberg when she was hired as a teller
were never referred to again, in either her own employment, or
regarding the employment of others. (R. 93, 52).

There was no

evidence that Kirberg was given a copy of the application form.
In February, 1989, Kirberg was promoted from teller to branch
manager of the West Jordan branch of West One bank. (R. 41). As
branch manager, Kirberg's duties included personnel issues in the
West One branch.

This in turn included employee discipline and

termination issues. (R. 94, 16).

Kirberg was given a Human

Resource Policy Manual, to use in employee matters involving
employees under her. A copy of a portion of the Manual entitled
"Dismissal" is attached to this affidavit. (R. 94, 17).
The Human Resource Policy Manual sets forth a system of
progressive steps of employee discipline, starting with supervisory
counseling,

and

verbal

warning,

and

escalating

to

written

reprimand, probation, suspension and dismissal. The Manual advises
that the severity of the problem is related to the degree of
discipline. (R. 94, 18-9).

Kirberg understood from reading the

Manual, from observing the employee discipline practices around
her, and was advised and trained as a branch manager, that any
discipline should be at the lightest (least) level necessary to
correct the problem. (R. 94, f8-9).

Further, Kirberg understood,

and was trained (as a branch manager), that an employee's problems
4

needed to be fully documented or proved before they could be
disciplined, to justify the severity of any action taken. (R. 94,
110).
Kirberg was specifically taught that a West One employee was
not to be fired without cause. (R. 94, 111).

Further, in the

hiring/firing practices Kirberg observed, no employee was ever
fired without cause. (R. 94, 111). In fact, there were at least
two instances where Kirberg wanted to dismiss an employee under her
for poor judgment and/or performance, but was told she could not by
her superiors.

Instead, Kirberg was told that she must first

counsel the employee, and warn them. In one instance, the employee
was simply not showing up for work.

This person was ultimately

transferred to another department. (R. 94, 112).
The only instance where someone under Kirberg was dismissed,
involved someone who admitted to stealing customer's money. (R. 94,
113).

Even this for-cause dismissal did not come until after the

employee personally confessed; prior to the confession, Kirberg was
not allowed to dismiss her. (R. 94, 113). Based upon what Kirberg
was

told, taught, read, and

observed,

she reached

a clear

understanding that West One had a policy of not firing people
without cause. (R. 94, 111).
During the time of Kirberg's employment, her conduct was
exemplary, and she never received any substandard written employee
5

reviews. (R. 2).

In January, 1991f she was evaluated as an

employee, and given good marks and an 8% pay raise.

(R. 88-92).

However, in late 1990, at a Chamber of Commerce meeting, Kirberg
had heard an unsubstantiated rumor that Dr. Robert Davis, a medical
doctor with substantial deposits at West One, and a substantial
existing loan, had been charged with rape and Medicaid fraud. (R.
43, 113; 44, 117; 96, 116). Kirberg was told that the problems
were several years old, and had been resolved.

(R. 96, 116).

Kirberg checked his loans, and found they were all current. (R. 96,
117).

Davis' loans remained current, and at least one has been

completely paid off. (R. 96, 118).
In early 1991, Davis sought another loan from West One.

(R.

96, 119). At the time of Davis' application for all his loans,
branch managers such as Kirberg were directed to submit loan
applications to a loan officer for review.

Accordingly, Kirberg

referred Davis' loan application to the loan officer for his review
and approval.

(R. 96, 120). Shortly thereafter, Kirberg learned

that the FBI was at that moment investigating Davis. (R. 96, 121).
Kirberg immediately called the loan officer, and told him to be
cautious in deciding whether to give a loan to Davis.

Kirberg

explained to him that the FBI was apparently investigating Davis.
(R. 96, 121).
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Once West One confirmed that Davis was being investigated by
the FBIf they fired Kirberg for failing to tell them in late 1990
about his legal problems. (R. 46, 126). Kirberg was fired despite
the fact that Davis met the ordinary loan underwriting guidelines
of West One, and West One had no way to call Davis' loans anyway.
(R. 96, 115, 22-25). Kirberg was fired despite the fact that she
was told that Davis' legal problems were several years old, and had
been resolved. (R. 96, 116). West One never alleged that it lost
one penny from Davis' accounts. The inference (most favorable to
Kirberg) is that West One simply overreacted to hearing bad news
about a customer, and fired a good branch manager in a panic.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Kirberg was initially an "at-will" employee of West One.
Kirberg averred that there was a subsequent agreement that she
would not be fired except for cause.

A jury could find this

modification was created by subsequent statements of Kirberg's West
One supervisors, the use and construction given the Employee
Manual, and the actual employee termination practices of West One.
The trial court erred by assuming that these facts, assumed to be
true,

were

insufficient

to

modify

relationship.

7

the

initial

"at-will"

ARGUMENT
POINT I
KIRBERG'S INITIAL "AT-WILL" CONTRACT WITH WEST ONE
WAS MODIFIED BY WEST ONE'S CONDUCT AND STATEMENTS
A, An Express At-Will Employment Contract Can Be Modified By
Subsequent Representations and Conduct.
An "at-will" employment relationship can be modified by a
subsequent

express or implied agreement.

Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991).

Johnson v. Morton
In Johnson, all five

justices of the Supreme Court agreed that an initial written "atwill" agreement found in an employee manual could be modified by a
subsequent express or implied agreement:
. . . it is true that subsequent expressed or implied
agreements could have modified the [written] at-will
employment relationship [found in the handbook]. . .".
Johnson, at 1004.

The majority and the concurrence both clearly

agreed that "an express contract can be modified by a subsequent
implied contract."

Johnson, at 1004, fn. 29; see also 1005-1006.

Accord, Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d

765

(Ohio App.

1984) (subsequent oral promises negated written disclaimer in policy
manual).
This is simply the flip side of the proposition that an
employment contract can be modified to include an "at-will"

8

provision. See Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F.Supp. 1128 (D.
Ariz. 1988)(after 14 years, employer added at-will disclaimer);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).2
See also Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks:
Further Encroachment on the Employment at Will Doctrine, 139 U.
Penn. L. Rev. 197, 216-219 (1991). What an employer can take away,
it certainly can give back.
B. Kirberg's Evidence Raised A Jury Question Whether The "At-Will"
Relationship Had Been Modified.
An employment agreement can be modified in the same ways that
it can be created:
The evidence that is relevant . . . includes the language
of the manual itself, the employer's course of conduct,
and pertinent oral representations.
Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991).

See also

Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989)
which stated that the at-will relationship could be modified by
"employment manuals, oral agreements, and all circumstances which
demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause . . .", as well
as "conduct of parties, announced personnel policies, practices of
that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances".

These cases were cited with approval by the majority
opinion in Johnson.
9

Johnson held that the language of the manual itself, could not
modify a statement in that same manual which set forth an "at-will"
relationship. Johnson had only relied upon the manual; there were
apparently no other representations, personnel practices or course
of conduct that went beyond the manual.
In contrast, Kirberg averred that she was taught that she
could not fire employees, except for cause.

Kirberg stated that

when she tried to fire incompetent employees, she was told she
could not, because there was not cause.
that

the Employee Manual

restricted

documented, serious problems.

She was further taught
termination, except

for

Whether this construction of the

Manual was legally correct or not, that is how the Manual was used
in practice. Finally, the employee termination practices that she
observed strongly indicated that West One employees were not to be
terminated without documented cause.
Johnson, at 1002, held that the "express statements of the
employer" were sufficient to modify an "at-will" relationship.
Kirberg

relied not only upon the express

statements

of the

employer, but the Employee Manual, its construction and use in
practice, and the course of conduct of West One in its employee
termination practices.

These were "communicated to the employee

[Kirberg]", they were "sufficiently definite to operate as a
contract provision", and were such that Kirberg could "reasonably
10

believe" West One's statements and conduct. Johnson, at 1002.

A

jury could easily find that West One modified the fine print by its
subsequent words and actions.
C. West One's Disclaimer Could Be Modified, Despite Its "Nonmodification" Language.
West One's disclaimer in the application form stated that no
company representative had authority to modify the disclaimer. (R.
118).

In Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761,

768 (Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court held that an insurance
agent could modify or waive provisions in an insurance application,
despite "boilerplate nonwaiver provisions if the insured reasonably
relied upon the agent's representations to the contrary. [Citations
omitted]."

There is likewise no reason why a bank official should

not be able to modify an employment agreement, despite "boilerplate
nonwaiver provisions" in the employment application.
The question of whether Kirberg was reasonable in relying upon
the representations and conduct of West One is one for the jury.
See Hardy v. Prudential, supra, at 769.

Kirberg stated that she

was never aware of the disclaimers in the employment application,
and that they were never referred to in her training about employee
termination practices.

Under these circumstances, a jury could

find her reliance upon what she was told and observed to be
reasonable.

11

P. Employees Should Not Be Manipulated By Oral Promises of Job
Security, Coupled With Contrary Written Disclaimers,
Employers use promises of job security as a motivational
device to encourage employee loyalty and productivity.

See Note,

Challenging the Employment-at-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract
Theory, 16 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 449 (1983).

On the other hand, ". . .

arbitrary

financial

discharge

creates

severe

and

emotional

hardships for employees who have relied upon express or implied
assurances of job security."

Id.

West One argued successfully to the trial court that use of a
written disclaimer could not be overcome with subsequent express
representations and conduct promising job security.
position, which
unreasonable.

West One's

ignores the holding of Johnson, is patently

If West One is correct, an employer can lie to an

employee for 45 years, stating that the employee will only be fired
for cause. However, if the employer had the foresight to insert a
disclaimer in the original application
employee would

be without a remedy

form, the unfortunate

as a matter

of

law if

arbitrarily fired 45 years later. Or, if the employee periodically
inserts the disclaimer on the back of paychecks, or in other
inconspicuous places, it will insulate itself from complying with
its promises of job security.

But it was these abuses of the

12

employer/employee relationship that Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), and its progeny sought to correct*
This court should not give a judicial blessing to West One's
practice of promising job security to motivate hard work and
loyalty from its employees, while inserting disclaimers into job
application forms. Most employees will not be sophisticated enough
to realize that West One's promises are contradicted by the fine
print.

Few employees will have the bargaining power necessary to

negotiate a revision to the job application form. The relationship
is one of great inequality; by definition, one party is hoping for
a job from the other. This job is given as a matter of grace, and
prospective

employees

are

exceedingly

unlikely

to

even

ask

questions about the meaning of fine print in the application form.
Given this relationship, the subsequent promises and conduct
of the employer should be given equal or greater weight than a
self-serving disclaimer inserted in an application form or employee
manual. The written disclaimers should simply be considered by the
jury in connection with all other manifestations of contractual
intent, to determine whether there was an express or implied
promise of job security.

13

CONCLUSION
West One wants to have its cake, and eat it too*

On the one

hand, it promotes employee dedication and loyalty through job
security promises and practices.

On the other hand, it wants to

retain the right to violate these promises at its whim, by use of
disclaimers.
If the mere use of disclaimers is sufficient to insulate
employers from being held to their subsequent promises, then
working class people have every reason to view the justice system
with cynicism. The courts are not so helpless, however, If a jury
finds that West One has contradicted its written disclaimer by
subsequent promises and/or conduct, West One should be held
accountable.
DATED this

/

day of December, 1992.

Daniel F. Bertch
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100
West Valley City, UT 84120
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
served

a

true

and

correct

/

day of December, 1992, I

copy

of

the

foregoing

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the following, by depositing four
copies thereof

in the United States mails, postage prepaid,

addressed as follows:
Elizabeth Dunning
Carolyn Cox
Watkiss, Dunning & Watkiss
111 East Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Daniel F. Bertch
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA J. KIRBERG,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

Case No. 910901640 CV

vs.

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

WEST ONE BANK,
Defendant.

Now^before the Court is defendant West One BanK'S IMotion.^for
Summary

Judgment.

affidavits

The

filed* in

Court

has

connection

reviewed

therewith,

the ffiemos and
has

heard

oral

argument, and having taken the matter ander advisement D°W rules
as follows:
It

is

clear

to

the

Court

that

the

initial

employment

relationship between plaintiff and defendant under the facts of
this

case

was

an

"at-will"

employment

relationship.

The

question before the Court is whether there is sufficient facts
to create a triable issue as to whether the parties intended to
modify

the

employment

relationship

to

limit the

defendant's

000143

ability

to

terminate

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

KIRBERG V. WEST ONE BANK

plaintiff.

Kirberg

argues

that

certain

conduct of the defendant and certain procedures set out in the
employee manuals created

an implied~in-fact

contract providing

that she could be terminated only for good cause.
It

is

important

to

plaintiff

and

employment

Kirberg's

employment

the

note

that

the

manual

contained

application

signed

in

throughout

effect

disclaimers

expressly

by

stating

that she could be discharged without notice and without cause,
that there was no express or implied employment contract between
her and the company and further that adherence to the policies
and

guidelines

constitute
reviewed

an

the

contained
expressed

facts which

in
or

the

code

implied

plaintiff

of

conduct

contract.
relies

on

did

not

Court

has

support

her

The
to

claim that in spite of the disclaimers there yas an implied in
fact contract between plaintiff and defendant and that could be
terminated

only

for good

cause.

The Court finds those

facts

relied on by plaintiff to be insufficient to create a triable
issue of fact as to an implied in fact contract and therefore
grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order consistent with
this ruling and submit it to the Court for signature,
DATED this

Z/M ^

day of June, 1992.

FRANK G. NOE
DISTRICT COUftT

AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA KIRBERG

iv

DISIRICT OOUR!

t?3
T.M,

2 3MPH*3Z

, „ ;,

CM ] [ f

; „ ! DISTRICT
[

CUJMIT

fc#l*

Daniel F. Bertch, A4728
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100
West Valley Cityf Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-7406
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA J. KIRBERG,
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA J. KIRBERG
Plaintiff,
Case No, 910901640 CV
WEST ONE BANK,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Patricia

J.

Kirberg, having

been duly

sworn, states

and

alleges under oath as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in this matter, and have personal

knowledge of the following.
2.

I never read the disclaimer of implied terms or the

disclaimer of requirement of just cause when I was hired as a
teller.

It was simply Included in the forms I was to fill out.

It

was never referred to in the employment interview, and there was no
statement made to me that I could be fired without cause.

0000°3

3.

The disclaimers given me when I was hired as a teller

were never referred to again, in either my own employment, or the
employment of others•
4.

I received no further disclaimers, except that sometime

in 1990, a code of ethics booklet was distributed to all employees.
There was no discussion of the specifics of the booklet with
anyonef and especially not concerning any disclaimer relating to
any right to fire employees without cause.
5.

The code of ethics disclaimer was never referred to again

in either my own employment, or the employment of others.
6.
my

As branch manager, my duties included personnel issues in

branch.

This

in

turn

included

employee

discipline

and

termination issues *
7.

I was given a Human Resource Policy Manual, to use in

employee matters involving employees under me. A copy of a portion
of the Manual entitled "Dismissal" is attached to this affidavit.
8.

The Human Resource Policy Manual sets forth a system of

progressive steps of employee discipline, including supervisory
counseling,

verbal

warning,

written

reprimand,

probation,

suspension and dismissal.
9.

The Manual advises that the severity of the problem is

related to the degree of discipline. The understanding I drew from
the Manual, the employee discipline practices I observed, and the
2

0000C/1

advice and training I received as a branch manager was that the
discipline should be at the lightest (least) level necessary to
correct the problem.
10.

Further,

I

understood,

and

was

trained,

that

an

employee's problems needed to be fully documented or proved before
they could be disciplined, to justify the severity of any action
taken.
11.

It was my understanding from the practices I observed,

and I was taught, that an employee was not fired arbitrarily or
without cause.

I cannot think o£ a single instance where this

happened.
12.

There were at least two instances where I wanted to

dismiss an employee under her for poor judgment and/or performance,
but I was told she could not by my superiors.

Instead, I was told

that I must first counsel the employee, and warn them.

In one

instance, the employee was simply not showing up for work.

This

person was ultimately transferred to another department.
13.

The only instance where someone under me was dismissed,

involved someone who admitted to stealing customer's money.

Even

this dismissal did not come until after the employee personally
confessed; prior to the confession, I was not allowed to dismiss
her.
14.

At the time I submitted Dr. Davis' loan applications, I
3
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had no knowledge of his problems with the State of Utah, with his
former employees, or with his patients.
15.

Dr.

forwarded,

and

Davis
he

solicited
satisfied

the

loan

the normal

applications
credit

that

guidelines

I
for

approving loans by the loan processing center. The applications do
not ask if a person has ever had any charges brought against them,
or ever been accused of overcharging a customer.

In fact, we were

told not to inquire about other personal information, other than
what was on the application form.
16.

I did hear an unsubstantiated rumor in November, 1990,

about Dr. Davis being charged with rape, overcharging customers and
unspecified Medicaid regulation violations.

I was told that all

the problems had been resolved in the past, and specifically, that
any criminal charges had been dismissed.

I understood the problems

to be at least several years old.
17.

At the time I heard these rumors (in November, 1990), I

did not know if it were true.

However, to protect West One, I

checked Dr. Davis' loans, and found that they were all current.
18.

To the best of my knowledge, Dr. Davis' loans with West

One are, and have been, current at all times.

In fact, the only

loan made to Dr. Davis after I heard the rumors, of $30,000.00, was
paid off in February, 1992.
19•

In January, 1991, Dr. Davis sought another loan to re4
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finance his business obligations.
20.

At the time of Dr. Davis* application for all his loans,

branch managers were directed to submit loan applications to Tim
Conklin, a loan officerf for his review.
Dr. Davis1

Accordingly, I referred

loan application to Tim Conklin for his review and

approval.
21.

Subsequently, in January, 1991, I was told by my daughter

that the FBI was in Dr. Davis' office.

I immediately called

Conklin, and told him to be cautious in deciding whether to give a
loan to Dr. Davis.

I explained to him that the FBI was apparently

investigating Dr. Davis.
22.

The unsubstantiated rumor I heard about Dr. Davis was not

enough to have called the existing loans, nor did Dr. Davis1
objective financial situation warrant any action on my part.
23.

At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis' loans, and up to

and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to
anyone who had ever been charged with rape, but had the charges
dismissed later.
24.

No customer was ever asked this question.

At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis' loans, and up to

and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to
anyone who had ever been accused of overcharging by a disgruntled
customer.
25.

No customer was ever asked this question.
At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis* loans, and up to
5

and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to
anyone who had ever been accused of violating governmental business
regulations.
26.

No customer was ever asked this question.

The only prior occasions when I received discipline were

for security problems with the people under me-

Specifically, the

employees involved had failed to lock an outer vault door on one
occasion, and failed to lock a cash drawer on another.
27.

The risk to the bank from these prior incidents was much

greater than the risk it faced from Dr. Davis* loans.

However, I

received only a written reprimand from these prior instances.
28.

In my three years of employment with West One, I had

observed a number of situations where an employee had been asked to
make a judgment call, and in hindsight, had made the call the wrong
way.

None of these employees were dismissed, even though it cost

the bank money on some occasions.
29.

It

is

unsubstantiated

my

belief

rumors

that

about

my

claims

decision
made

not

regarding

doctor's past conduct was a judgment call on my part.

to
a

pass

on

medical

I felt that

I owed it to Dr. Davis not to spread rumors that might have been
very damaging, and very false.
30.

Whether my

judgment was right or wrong, it was not

sufficient grounds to dismiss me, when judged against the prior
instances of dismissal of West One employees.
6
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FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this J?>3 day of March, 1992

^^A^C^

Patricia

SUBSGRIDED Al?P»4WOItW^feo b e f o r e
1992.

B yrfS^SX

±*?z.

f|

sfr^Ss.

Kirberc

me t h i s

ol3

day

of

March,

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH
My Commission Expires
September 17,1995

RANDEE ROUSE

NOTARY PUBLIC

3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100
West Vafoy City, Utah 84120

My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

^dt

y/7/f Z£
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000

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the £s)

day of March, 1992, I served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA J.
KIRBERG upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the
United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Elizabeth Dunning
Carolyn Cox
Watkiss & Saperstein
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Daniel F. Bertch
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)REF1NANG. ~<**OUP/HUMAN k£SOUk~E POUC\ MANUAL
PLOYEE RELATIONS

Discipline

HRPM 130

RPORATE POLICY
iloyees of Moore Financial Group whose Job performance or conduct is
^standard or who violate corporate or affiliate policies, practices, or
ulatlons are subject to disciplinary action. Depending on the severity of
problem, disciplinary action may result in progressive discipline, a
fotiated voluntary separation, or Immediate Involuntary separation.
a company encourages harmonious working relationships among
>ervisors and employees. If possible, problems should be resolved on an
:>rmal basis.
If more serious action Is appropriate, the following
ciplJnary actions should be considered.
•
m
•
•
•

Supervisory
counseling
Verbal warning
Written reprimand
Probation
Suspension

•

Dismissal.

Itten documentation of the problem and the actions taken to correct It are
pful as a basis for avoiding misunderstanding of the issues involved,
abll«*hlng a record of corrective action agreed upon, and knowing If the
}b!em has been resolved or l£ more progressive disciplinary action is approate. Documentation Is also helpful as a basis for fair and honest perfornce evaluations.
RPORATE GUIDELINES
forms of disciplinary action, be they counseling s e s s i o n s , verbal
r n l n g s , reprimands, probation, suspension and-or dismissals should be
cumented by the immedlte supervisor.
Contact your appropriate Human
source department for assistance In carrying through disciplinary action.

K 00026

00010?

EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION

V

national origin, handicap, or any other basis prohibited by locai, sraie, or
federal law.

HJP

f

&

M'Chg^

"

COMPANY US£ ONIX

••v

kwWiM^ff;

\0'Q5'88

9A

APPLICATION

LlVy

krwff#»a

HEBfcnm.

[ATE ZIP

a

[PCFFneHC* CHECK
{

*ILABLE

?oi- 5 7 ^ ^ 2 1 1

>N<S> APPLIED FO«

F*_£ DCSWHADOH

BUSINESS / MESSAGE PHONE

IMOMP PHONE

poernoN coNttocjwioN(ty

\e.r T i m ^
REFERREO BY

•fi^h

[jt\l*W
1 FULL TIME

•

9 ^ A R T TIME (hours) O • SO

~

TEMPORARY

D-DAYS

3 .3 0

•

NIGHTS

L—_

,__,

_

J

"4Y NAME AND AOORESS

anla.

C\<X<i'M focLhory^f &xn fc.
PEASON FOR LEAVING

PS

as>Otc/

TSOWSNAME^J

fo£i"&

p

^

•e.<.v^<^

frusbai'cf - f e n & y Q U f i c 7 ?

fU, pnvJ p ^ < f

y -

Q,\\

„

MAY WE CONTACT?

_

Kspr.-,c,

1

„ - ^

c4-

NUMBER

rtSOR S NAME

6.7 5 *~

T* / /-^

M<^y <£f

LOCSHJ

^ .
a, -owj i. c. ^ e-t
lev*,

•>

oC^-icx^

Y NAWP
NAME AND ADOflFM
AOORESS

STARTINQ SALARY

ENDING POSITION

(3YES D NO

&CDU3K)

V JOS PKSPONSWIUTieS

STARTING POSITON

VjOlV^rs

.

REASON FOR LEAVING

W Q V J

Q <
'

ENOING SALARY

office
bMS^K^a

cP+.t-OO
^v'c/cf^U'ot

frfc,SCo^a<-

^

HIRE OATE

STARTING POSTTION

STARTING SALARY

LAST DATE

ENOJNO POSTTION

ENDING SALARY

HIRE DATE

STARTING POSITION

STARTING SALARY

LAST DATE

ENOING POSITION

ENDING SALARY

i

HIRE DATE

STARTINO POSITION

STARTING S A l * R *

MAY WE CONTACT'

LASTOATE

ENOING POSITION

ENDING S>t-AA

MAY W€ CONTACT?

D YES D NO
Y JOB RESPONSIBILITIES

*Y NAME AND AOORESS

NUMBER

MSOR S NAME

REASON FOR L£>MNO

MAY WE C0NTACT7

•

YES • NO

•v JOB RESPONSIBILITIES

NY NAMC AND AOORESS

NUMBER

'ISOR S NAME

REASON FOR LEAVINO

•

YES • NO

Y JOB RESPONSIBILITIES

DEPOSITION
j EXHIBIT
fl5)

3

jo-llf-q^rl-

•w oooou
000117

urf^L\

-^\\£rt

Mur

^b c U v --•-

r^)«.j

{

y

t H Gt*<HM»C SCHOOt

CC;

U--/ a. L__

MAJOR

DEGREE

0 PA

MAJOR

DEGREE

G?A

3 TYflNG

wp m

3 SHORTHAND
3

. wpm

10 KEY (by touch)

U DICTATING EQUIPMENT

spm

D

SYSTEMS fspec/M / - A l > » QU<>t l\£>

U

WORD
PROCESSING (specify)

U

OFFICE
'
, ; \L\
MACHINES (specify) ( ^ ( ^ My'^M 71/;

CB-0ATA ENTRY / KEYPUNCH

•

PROOF OPERATION

ndicate any other skills which may qualify you for the position you seek

have any handicaps or health problems which would interfere with or all eel the successful performance of the job for which you are applying or which you would like
3 take into account in determining your job placement? It yes, please describe any specific reasonable accommodations MFGI can make that would assist you in working here

S

0NO

'ou ever been convicted of a criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust (including, but not limited to robbery, embezzlement, forgery, perjury, tax evasion
koplifting)? If yes please explain

ES D NO

A conviction wiM not necessanty bar applicant from e/np/cymenf
company has ever refused to issue a bond for you, please explain (include name of the bonding company and when this happened)

have ever been terminated from employment, please explain

e explain your career interests and goals and any particular Interest you have in banking and employment with Moore Financial Group

Lnvr,

hit.u> ^/o ^CutUc-Ke^

ViMctc^ <v I^Ctjuiy

ptcyu/.

rfw

/PtA-toi.

tu^tt.

^jl^C/w07v

yZ>/v>

^L -)&.

^/{<^j

/;?j?u<y Mfcfc

thorlze tho release of all high school, college, or other educational records pertaining to my attendance, course work anO other school activities
ther consent to the disclosure of any and all Information about me contained in private and government files relevant to this application for employment
aiating to my present and former employment history, and I request all present and former employers and federal, state and local government agencies
upply this Information to you on your request You are also authorized to make any investigation of my personal history and financial and credit record
>ugh any Investigative or credit agencies or bureaus of your choice
jreby ask my present and former employers to furnish you any personnel information you request and \ release my present and former employers from
t liability that may arise as a result of their providing this information to Moore Financial Group
iderstand and agree that if I am employed by Moore Financial Group or any of its related companies or subsidiaries (the "company"), that I may resign
may be discharged at any time without notice and without cause I understand no company representative has any authority to enter into an agreement
h me different or contrary to the foregoing I also understand that if I accept employment, there is no express or implied employment contract between
> and the company I agree to comply with alt of the company's policies and procedures
1

lify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete I undorst
nderstatKi that misrepresentations or falsification/^ Ptatemcnks made
us application constitute grounds for immediate dismissal.
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/

day of December, 1992, I

served four true and correct copies of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO
APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the following, by depositing copies thereof
in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Elizabeth Dunning
Carolyn Cox
Watkiss & Saperstein
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Daniel F. Bertch
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